

EXPLANATION
of
JAPANESE DEFENCE PLAN AND BATTLE OF IWO JIMA

CHICHI JIMA
January 25, 1946.

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Instructions of war telegraphed from Lieutenant General Kuribayashi to the Chief of the General Staff.

1. Preface.

I will state the outline of Japanese defense plan and battle of Iwo Jima by the kind advice of an American officer.

To tell the truth, I have a very deep impression in regard to this problem, because I was concerned in defense plan of Iwo Jima and especially devoted my body and soul to its supply under my respectful Lieutenant General Kuribayashi.

And every day since American forces landed on Iwo Jima on the 19th of February, 1945, I wrote on my map of all battle reports communicated from Iwo Jima and studied tactics noting my opinions on it, but I am very sorry to say, I had burnt all of them when Iwo fell and I have to pick it out from my poor memory.

I am unable to state my opinion without rending my heart to many officers and men of Japan and America who sacrificed their respectful lives.

I express my grateful thanks to Colonel Rixey (Island Commander of American Occupation Forces, Chichi Jima) and Captain Kusiak (his Staff Officer) for their helpful criticisms to my humble booklet.

2. General Situation.

a. History of Iwo Jima.

About seventy years ago Iwo Jima became the territory of Japan with Chichi Jima and Haha Jima. But we had no special product on this island and it had been written on the geographical book as only an island of sulphur spring, no water, no sparrow and no swallow. And it was indeed after Truk was raided by American Task Force at February, 1944 and our Great Fleet retired from there, when we (except several officers) began to think much of this island in connection with our strategy.

b. Situation of Spring, 1944.

In 1943 our Navy constructed the 1st airfield (near Mt. Suribachi) on Iwo Jima and made it an intermediate aircraft base from Japan to Marianas, and used it also as an aircraft base for our convoy strategy.

In February, 1944 we had only the following strength on Iwo Jima:

Naval Air Force	1,500 men
Aircraft	20

From February to March, Japanese Imperial Headquarters increased the strength of Iwo Jima and at the end of March our Army and Navy were as follows:

Army	3,000
Navy	2,000
Aircraft	20

In those days Army was under the command of Chichi Jima fortress and Navy was under the command of Yokosuka air force.

c. Situation of Summer and Autumn, 1944.

From March to June Japanese Imperial Headquarters has sent about ten divisions to Middle Pacific area and especially did their very best to strengthen Saipan, Guam and Palao and endeavoured to re-establish our Great Fleet.

On the other hand Japanese Imperial Headquarters came to recognize the value of Iwo Jima and began to study what existence influence of this isolated island does to the main land of Japan when Marianas fall to the enemy hand.

From March to June the Chichi Jima fortress commander was under the command of the 31st Army of Saipan, and Army and Navy of Bonin Islands was under the single control of Chichi Jima fortress commander.

June 15, American forces landed on Saipan and on 19th our Great Fleet was defeated by American 5th Fleet at 270 sea miles north of Yap Island. And Japanese Imperial Headquarters gave up their plan of repossessing Saipan and determined to reinforce Iwo Jima with a part of this repossessing strength.

On 15th of June about 100 of our naval aircraft were defeated by the first American air raids.

In those days we did not have any strong defence fortification on this island and it was as hazardous as a pile of eggs. At that time if American forces had assaulted Iwo Jima, it would be completely occupied in 2 or 3 days.

On 30th of June Japanese Imperial Headquarters made the 109th Division appointing Lieutenant General Kuribayashi as the Divisional Commander, putting him under the direct command of the Imperial Headquarters.

I, who had been concerned in the plan of repossessing Saipan as a staff officer of the 31st Army in those days, became a staff officer of Lieutenant General Kuribayashi on the same day.

On the other hand, at the end of June, Navy made the 3rd Aircraft Fleet at Kisarazu and brought the air force of Iwo Jima under the command of this Fleet as the 27th Air Force.

We had the following Army strength to be sent to Iwo Jima from Chichi Jima after July:

145th Infantry Regiment	
3rd Battalion of the 17th Mixed Regiment	
26th Tank Regiment	
Anti-tank gun Independent Battalion	5
Machine gun Independent Battalion	2
Mortar Company	1
Rocket gun Company	1
Assault Company	1
25mm Machine gun Company	2
Other Units	
Total	about 14,000 men

But enemy's disturbances by airforces and submarines were severe and we had bad weather many times, so the transportation of this strength by sea delayed and continued to the very time American forces landed on Iwo Jima.

Lieutenant General Kuribayashi placed the detached headquarters at Chichi Jima as Major Horie the head of it, and made him in charge of transportation, supply and communication.

Navy also increased the strength of Iwo Jima, by crushing many difficulties.

d. Chief Persons.

(a) Lieutenant General Kuribayashi.

Graduated Military Academy and Military College, Calvary

Officer. Stayed in Canada for 2 years. Had a long service in the War Office and mostly appointed as staff officer.

He was a poet and wrote "Aiba Koshin Kyoku" (a song of loving horses) and "Aikoku Koshin Kyoku" (a song of loving his nation).

At Iwo Jima, one night, I talked with him thoroughly, and he told me as follows:

"When I was in Canada I went to the United States and saw many factories. I pay my respects to the greatness of American mass-production. I think that 'Victory or Defeat' of this War will be decided by the production power. Don't you think so?"

(b) Major General Osuga.
(Ex-commander of 2nd Mixed Brigade)

Graduated Military Academy and Military College, Artillery Officer. Appointed as the Chichi Jima fortress commander in March, 1944 from Kyurun fortress commander.

Appointed as the commander of 2nd Mixed Brigade on 30th of June when the 109th Division was made. In December, entered in field hospital of Iwo Jima, suffering from paratyphus.

Had gentle and quiet personality.

(c) Major General Senda.
(Commander of 2nd Mixed Brigade)

Appointed as the commander of 2nd Mixed Brigade in December, 1944 as successor of Major General Osuga from commander of Sendai Reserve Military Academy.

Graduated Military Academy. Served in Infantry School, School for Non-commissioned Officers, etc. Had experience of Infantry Regimental Commander. Well acquainted with infantry battle.

(d) Colonel Hori.
(Ex-Chief of Staff)

Graduated Military Academy and Special Course of Military College. Had experience of teacher of Military Academy, Infantry Regimental Commander and Chief of Staff of Homeland Division.

Appointed as the Chief of Staff of the 109th Division on 30th of June. Was discharged from this position and was attached to the 2nd Mixed Brigade Headquarters in December, 1944.

Had gentle and quiet personality.

(e) Colonel Takaishi.
(Chief of Staff)

Graduated Military Academy and Special Course of Military College, Infantry Officer.

Appointed as the successor of Colonel Hori in December, 1944.

Well acquainted with infantry battle, very energetic and was a poet.

(f) Staff Officers (from old to young by age).

Lieutenant Colonel Nakane	Operation Staff.
Lieutenant Colonel Nishikawa	Supply Staff.
Major Yoshida	Fortification Staff.
Major Yamanouchi	Intelligence Staff.
Major Horie	Head of Chichi Jima Detached Headquarters.

(g) Lieutenant Colonel Nishi.
(Commander of the 26th Tank Regiment)

Baron, Cavalry Officer, a champion of Olympic Horse Games.

(h) Rear Admiral Ichimaru.
(Commander of the 27th Air Force)

Graduated Naval Academy. Famous pilot of Naval Air Force.

(i) Naval Staff Officers.

Commander Mase - Senior and Operation Staff.
Lieut. Commander Okazaki - Supply Staff.
Lieut. Commander Akada - Defence Staff.

3. Defence Plan of Iwo Jima.

a. Many discussions regarding the defence plan of Iwo Jima.

Iwo Jima was very near to the main land of Japan and was able to place many aircraft. Then we thought much of this island and discussed the value of it many times at Tokyo and Iwo Jima.

First, at Iwo Jima some officers said as follows:

"We will not be left as an isolated force, we can keep on fighting by expecting the assistance of air forces and fleets from the main land of Japan, so the plan should be an offensive defence."

At Tokyo, some officers said as follows:

"We must make a plan how to use this Iwo Jima and need not be anxious about the fall of Iwo Jima."

At that time, I, Major Horie, was one of the officers who observed the situation of this War most pessimistically and insisted on my opinion as follows:

"Now we have no fleet and no air forces. If American forces will assault this island it will fall into their hands in one month.

Therefore it is absolutely necessary not to let the enemy use this island. The best plan is to sink this island in the sea or cut the island in half. At least we must endeavour to sink the 1st airfield.

In the future, if by any chance we have an opportunity to take an offensive step again in the Pacific area, we will not use Iwo Jima."

At the General Staff Office and the Naval Staff Office, there were some officers who had the same ideas. Especially one staff officer asked me to calculate the necessary explosive quantity to sink Iwo Jima.

Lieutenant General Kuribayashi also concurred with me. But in September, 1944 he inspected the whole island of Iwo Jima with me and investigated how to dispose of this island, and in conclusion we found out that the disposition of this island was quite impossible and we should make this island much stronger by fortification.

However, we had the same idea that even if we placed any strength on the 1st airfield it will be immediately defeated by the enemy under his severe bombardments of air forces and vessels, and it is better for us not to place any strength on this airfield.

Later, one staff officer of the 3rd Aircraft Fleet came to Iwo Jima and insisted on saying he should like to give many 25mm machine guns and materials from the Navy and make many pillboxes around the 1st airfield.

And in October, he began to make pill boxes, using several battalions every day, and after three months he made 135. When American forces landed on Iwo Jima he could scarcely complete all of them.

In fact, this airfield was trodden by American Forces in only two days. If we had infused this great strength, many materials and three months of labor which were used on the airfield, into the defence of Motoyama district and Mt. Suribachi, we would have been able to make these areas much stronger.

b. Our judgement regarding enemy's plan.

We got various information that many American vessels were gathering at Ulithi, Guam and Saipan from the end of January, 1945 and we thought at Tokyo and Iwo Jima that American forces would land on Iwo Jima or Okinawa.

In my opinion the possibility of landing of American forces at Iwo Jima was 40% and that of Okinawa, 60%.

We thought that if American forces land on Iwo Jima, she will occupy the 1st airfield and make an offensive base there and use many tanks. Therefore we endeavoured especially to strengthen the defense of Mt. Suribachi and the front of Minamiburaku, Tankuiwa and Osakayama, and the training of anti-tank battle.

c. Many discussions regarding the location of the 109th Divisional Headquarters.

Many officers insisted on that since Iwo Jima is the first front line it is better to let the 2nd Brigade Commander be Island Commander, and Divisional Commander should stay at Chichi Jima where it is convenient to control the supply and communications of all over the Bonin Islands. But Vice Chief of General Staff, General Ushiroku and Lieutenant General Kuribayashi, said as follows:

"Iwo Jima is the most important island and the enemy will surely come to get it. So we should place the Divisional Headquarters at Iwo Jima."

And Lieutenant General Kuribayashi determined to place the detached headquarters at Chichi Jima in order to supply and communicate with each island.

d. Changes of the plan and execution of the defensive dispositions.

Until October, 1944, we had a plan not to place any strength on the 1st airfield, but because of the above mentioned reason, we changed our plan and placed there two battalions.

e. A problem how Army and Navy should be disposed.

Army had an opinion that they should be disposed for the defence of all over the island and Naval troops should be disposed under the command of each district Army commander.

But Navy was very anxious to defend one district by himself and insisted on that it is better to make plans for mutual understanding, by strengthening the union and display the fighting power.

Then in conclusion, the main power of Navy was put in charge of the defence of Minamiburaku district and Army was in charge of the defence of all the rest of the island.

f. The defence policy of Lieutenant General Kuribayashi.

June, 1944 --

Strengthen Motoyama and Mt. Suribachi districts and especially hold big reserve (including the 26th Tank Regiment), and if the enemy lands on the 1st airfield make offensive operation towards seaside and annihilate the enemy.

January, 1945 --

Each man should think his defence position as his graveyard, fight until the last and give many damages to the enemy.

g. Discussions regarding the value of anti-aircraft gun.

I insisted on this problem as follows:

"We should change our plan to use most of the anti-aircraft guns as artillery and remain very small part of them as anti-aircraft guns. Anti-aircraft guns are good to protect the disclosed targets, especially ships, but are invaluable for the covering of the land defence."

But the opinion of the staff officers of Iwo Jima have inclined as follows:

"At Iwo Jima, it is good to use anti-aircraft guns both as anti-aircraft guns and as artillery. And as the natural features of Iwo Jima are weaker than that of Chichi Jima, if we have no anti-aircraft guns, our defensive positions will be completely destroyed by the enemy's air raids."

And so most of the 300 anti-aircraft guns were used in both sense as above mentioned.

But later, when American forces landed on Iwo Jima, those anti-aircraft guns were put to silence in one or two days. And we had the evidence that anti-aircraft guns were not valuable. But 7.5cm anti-aircraft guns, prepared as anti-tank guns, were very valuable.

h. Fortification of an underground tunnel.

In order to connect with each defence position of Motoyama district, we planned to make 28,000 meters underground tunnel, and began this work in December, 1944. But by the time American forces landed on Iwo Jima we only made 5,000 meters.

i. Training for battle.

Lieutenant General Kuribayashi insisted on the following trainings:

- (a) Bodily attacks against enemy tanks.
- (b) Cutting-in attacks.
- (c) Sniping

Especially he made special badges for the men who were in charge of bodily attacks against enemy tanks and men in charge of cutting-in attacks.

4. Strength, Arms and Ammunitions (Army and Navy) on the 1st of February, 1945.

Strength 23,000 (Army 17,500; Navy 5,500)

ARMS		Ammunition (rounds)	
Big guns (more than 7.5 cm)	120	Total	100,000
Anti-aircraft gun (more than 25mm MG)	300	Each gun	500
Small gun (including heavy and light machine guns)	20,000	Total	22,000,000
Howitzer (8 cm, 12 cm)	130	Each	90
Mortar (20 cm)	20	Each	40
Rocket gun (20 cm)	70	Each	50
Anti-tank gun (47 mm)	40	Each	600
Anti-tank gun (37 mm)	20	Each	500
Tanks	27		

5. Situation of Supply.

a. System of Supply.

Army and Navy both had two systems as follows:

- (i) Tokyo---Iwo Jima (by destroyer, high speed transport and SB (something like the American LST but smaller in size)).
- (ii) Tokyo--Chichi Jima (by ship and/or high speed transport).
- ⋮
- Iwo Jima (by sailing boats, fishing boats and SB).

Most transportation belonged to the later system.

b. Damages of ships.

Especially after August, 1944, the power of American air forces and submarines was very severe and from Tokyo to Chichi Jima, in Futami Ko and especially from Chichi Jima to Iwo Jima, we had many damages and on the sea we lost more than 1500 men and 50,000 tonnages of materials.

c. Work of unloading and loading at Chichi Jima as supply center and unloading work at Iwo Jima.

When materials were sent to Chichi Jima from the main land of Japan, we unloaded them on Omura during darkness and intermissions of the enemy's air raids, and we dispersed them to the interior of this island.

To Iwo Jima we sent them by sailing boats and fishing boats. This was very hard work and many times we used 2,000 men and 50 trucks a whole day without sleeping and resting. No harbor, rough waves and severe air raids gave the greatest hindrance to the unloading work at Iwo Jima. At Iwo Jima we could not place "daihatsu" (landing craft) on the sea, and when we finished unloading, we had to pull them up on the land.

d. Supply crisis of November, 1944.

In November, 1944, we had only about 30 days of grain and 15 days of supplementary food, and we came to a very dangerous situation. But afterwards, we were able to increase the food a little by brave and self-sacrificing transportation.

e. Provisions of February 1, 1945 (Army and Navy).

Grain	about 70 days.
Supplementary food	about 60 days.

6. Convoy Strategy to Cover the Supply Transportation.

Until June of 1944, American Aircraft did not come to Chichi Jima areas, so we only thought of anti-submarine convoy. Namely our transports were protected primarily by our destroyers or coast defence ships and few assistance of aircraft from Tateyama, Hachijyo Jima, Chichi Jima and Iwo Jima.

After June American aircraft and submarines started attacking out transports in this area and we were obliged to think of night transportation and night work, and so to protect our ships we have sent one Army aircraft squadron to Iwo Jima.

I experienced bitterly how miserable our transportation by sea was when the air and sea was in the hands of enemy's control.

7. Everyday Life and Sanitary Situation of Officers and Men.

Officers and men of Iwo Jima were suffering from lack of water, they gathered rain water in empty barrels and bottles and used it.

As they were unable to take both because of the water shortage, they were obliged to go to Kitakaigan to take hot sulphur springs. I also went to that hot spring once.

There were no fresh vegetables, and especially had many malnutrition and paratyphus patients. And in those days, I think 20% of the whole troops were patients.

8. Battle.

a. Landing operation of American forces on the 1st airfield and our battle.

On the 19th of February, American forces landed on the first airfield under cover of their keen bombardments of aircraft and warships. Although their landing direction, strength and fighting were same as our judgement, we could not take any counter-measures towards them, and 135 pill boxes we had at the first airfield were trodden down and was occupied in only two days after their landing. We shot them bitterly with the artillery we had at Motoyama and Mt. Suribachi, but they were immediately destroyed by the enemy's counter-firing.

At that time we had opportunities to make offensive attacks against the enemy, but we knew well that if we do so we will suffer many damages from American bombardments of aircraft and vessels, therefore our officers and men waited the enemy of coming closer to their own positions.

b. Fall of Mt. Suribachi.

We were very discouraged when we heard of the fall of Mt. Suribachi after only three days fighting. When I received the telegram at Chichi Jima from Iwo Jima that District Commander of Mt. Suribachi informed to Lieutenant General Kuribayashi by wire saying "Enemy's bombardments from air and sea and their assaults with explosions are very fierce and if we try to stay and defend our present positions it will lead us to self-destruction. We should rather like to go out of our position and choose death by 'banzai' charges." I was bursted with emotion.

I knew the fall of the first airfield, but I never thought of losing Mt. Suribachi in only three days.

c. Appearance of American M4 Tank.

When American M4 tank appeared in front of Osakayama, Lieutenant General Kuribayashi was very anxious to know how to dispose of this tank. Even our 47mm anti-tank gun could not destroy it, and at last came to the conclusion that bodily attacks with explosives was the only way to destroy it.

d. Value of bombardment of American air forces and vessels.

Lieutenant General Kuribayashi informed Tokyo by wire as follows:

"I am not afraid of the fighting power of only three American Marine Divisions if there are no bombardment from aircraft and warships. This is the only reason why we have to see such miserable situation."

e. Battle command of Lieutenant General Kuribayashi.

Lieutenant General Kuribayashi was usually at his commanding place in the cave. As soon as his staff officers made telegrams with the information which came into their hands from time to time from each troops, he inspected, revised and ordered to dispatch them. As he was very skilful in making compositions, so his telegrams let all Japanese weep in those days.

f. Value of cutting-in (infiltration) attacks.

At first we received an information that the value of our cutting-in (infiltration) attacks were giving great damages to the enemy. But at the beginning of March the information to Tokyo by wire was as follows:

"The look-out American forces became very strict and it is difficult to pass through their guarded line. Don't over-estimate the value of cutting-in attacks."

g. Supply from Japan by aircraft.

I pay many respects to two brave aviators who supplied weapons to Iwo Jima by aircraft. They made arrangements with Iwo Jima Commander, and started Isamamatsu (Japan) airfield and supplied hand grenades and flame projectors.

It is indeed difficult to express how the hearts of the fighting youth of Iwo Jima who stood before their death were when they saw these brave flyers.

h. Desperate fight of Army and Navy.

According to the telegraphic reports of Lieutenant General Kuribayashi, we can find the following desperate fights:

(a) 7th March --

All troops of Tamanayama district are fighting desperately by facing the enemy with only 80 meter distance. 7 small units sent for infiltration attack from Tamanayama on the 6th night are not back yet and their results are unknown.

(b) 8th, 1000 --

(i) Today, from 0630, the enemy is attacking Northern district. His bombardments from mortars and warships are very severe.

(ii) Several troops of the enemy are advancing towards Naval Headquarters hill (near "Kitaburaku) and Hyoriuboku.

(iii) All surviving fighting bases have sustained heavy losses, but their fighting spirits are running high and they are giving great damages to the enemy.

(c) 8th, 1800 --

Troops at Tamanayama and Nother districts are still holding their position thoroughly and continued giving damages to the enemy. Their fighting situation believing their country's victory looks god-like.

(d) 8th, 2000--

I am very sorry that I have let the enemy occup one part of the Japanese territory, but I am taking comfort in giving heavy damages to the enemy.

(e) 10th, 1930--

(i) Although the attacks of the enemy against our Northern districts are continuing day and night, our troops are still fighting bravely and holding their positions thoroughly.

(ii) ~~Divisional radio station was fighting under the siege~~ of many enemy's troops from the 8th, but finally today at 1130 destroyed the radio telegraph.

(iii) 200 or 300 American infantrymen with several tanks attacked "Tenzan" all day. The enemy's bombardment from one battleship (or cruiser), 11 destroyers and aircraft are very severe, especially the bombing and machine gun firing against Divisional Headquarters from 30 fighters and bombers are so fierce that I cannot express nor write here.

Before American forces landed on Iwo Jima, there were many trees around my Headquarters, but now there are not even a grasp of grass remaining. The surface of the earth has changed completely and we can see numerous holes of bombardments.

(f) 10th, 2000--

At "Tamanayama", the 2nd Mixed Brigade Headquarters became dangerous, and they might go out for "Banzai" charge on the midnight of 8th, because we cannot contact with them after that.

(g) 11th, 1050--

(i) Surviving strength of Northern districts (Army and Navy) are now 1500.

(ii) On the 9th we gave 798 men and one tank losses to the enemy.

(h) 11th, 1400--

(i) On the 8th, one M4 tank stopped on the rugged ground of the Northern district and one man was trying to go out from the canopy, just at that time, Superior Private Gondo sniped him, threw a hand-grenade into the tank and burnt it.

(ii) We cannot contact with the commander of the "Tamanayama" district from yesterday.

(iii) From this morning the enemy began to concentrate their shooting of warships, firing of mortars, heavy artillery and bombing of aircraft to Northern districts.

(I) 13th, 0800--

By the captured documents, we found out that the enemy is the 3rd, 4th, and 5th Marine Divisions, and the 5th Division is now in "Tenzan" area.

On 12th we gave the following damages to the enemy only in Northern districts:

Shot down 1 aircraft and killed about 200 men.

(j) 14th, 1500--

The attack to the Northern district from this morning became much severe than before, and at about noon, one part of the enemy with 10 tanks broke through our left front line and approached to 200 meters east of the Divisional Headquarters.

(k) 15th, 0800--

(i) To: Chici Jima Signal Corps Commander.

From: Iwo Jima Signal Corps Commander.

"Situation is very dangerous. Do your best to contact with us".

(ii) Present strength of the Northern districts are about

900.

(l) 15th, 0930 --

Since the 10th main power of the 26th Tank Regiment and one part of the Navy (about 300 men together) near Manburaku repulsed the enemy several times.

(m) 16th, 0800 --

Our surviving strength are now as follows:

Northern districts 500

Eastern districts 300

(n) 17th, 0200 --

From: Lieutenant General Kuribayashi.

To: All surviving officers and men.

- i. The battle situation came to the last moment.
- ii. I want my surviving officers and men to go out and attack the enemy tonight.
- iii. Each troop! Go out simultaneously at midnight and attack the enemy until the last. You all have devoted yourself to His Majesty, the Emperor. Don't think of yourself.
- iv. I am always at the head of you all.

(o) 17th, 0500 --

The 145th Infantry Regiment fought bravely near Hyoriuboku, holding their Regimental Flag in the center.

The last telegram sent to me on 15th was as follows:

"Here we burnt our brilliant Regimental Flag completely. Good bye."

(p) 21st, 1200 --

(i) At midnight of 17th I went out from my cave and gathered all survivors of the 145th Infantry Regiment, Tamanayama, Northern, Eastern and Western districts, westward of Kitaburaku and we are continuing our fighting.

I have 400 men under my control.

(ii) The enemy besieged us and at 18th and 19th approached us by firing and flame of their tanks.

Especially they are trying to approach to the entrance of our cave with explosives.

(q) 21st, 1300 --

(i) 20th and 21st, my officers and men are still fighting.

(ii) The enemy's front line is 200 or 300 meters from us, and they are attacking by tank-firing.

(iii) They advised us to surrender by a loud-speaker, but we only laughed at this childish trick and did not set ourselves against them.

(r) 22nd, 0910 --

Naval Headquarters came to our cave on 16th and are fighting together.

(s) 22nd, 1000 --

Divisional Commander, officers and men are continuing fighting.

i. The last moments of Lieutenant General Kuribayashi.

Lieutenant General Kuribayashi commanded his battle under the candle lights without having a single rest nor sleep day after day. Radio broadcasts, newspapers and magazines of Japan encouraged him thoroughly. Especially, old and young men, boys and girls of his native place, prayed God for his victory.

On 14th of March "Song of Iwo Jima", composed by the fighting men on Iwo Jima, before the American forces landed, was broadcast to Lieutenant General Kuribayashi, officers and men from Tokyo, and he sent his thankful message to all Japanese.

On 15th of March, he informed Tokyo by wire as follows:

"I determined to go out and make banzai charges against the enemy at midnight of the 17th. Now I say good-bye to all senior and friend officers everlastingly."

And he added three farewell songs in this telegram. From the morning of the 17th we were unable to communicate with him, and we thought that the 17th of March was his death day.

He was promoted to General on the 17th. But we were greatly surprised when we received his telegram suddenly on the 21st morning. We knew from this telegram that he and his men (Army and Navy all together 400 men) went out on the midnight of the 17th and shut themselves in the cave 150 meters northwest from his old cave.

He sent the last following telegram to us:

"We have not eaten nor drank for 5 days. But our fighting spirit is still running high. We are going to fight bravely till the last."

I did my very best at Chichi Jima to send him the telegram of his promotion to General on the 17th of March. On the evening of the 23rd one radio operator informed me by wire:

"All officers and men of Chichi Jima, Good-bye" from Iwo. I tried to communicate with them for 3 days after that, but finally I did not get their answer.

9. Why Japanese Soldier Does Not Surrender.

In Japanese opinion, if the Japanese soldiers stand on a battle field they ought to devote their body and soul, namely, the only way is to select victory or death for the honour.

From ancient time, this has been the Japanese soldiers' custom, tradition or common sense, and if by a chance the prisoners of war return to their homeland after the war ceases they will be treated as a coward by all Japanese.

Therefore at Iwo Jima, on 23rd of March, even though there were about 300 Japanese survivors, most of them did not surrender to the enemy and fought till the very end of their lives.

10. Conclusion.

When I look back the Japanese defence plan and battle of Iwo Jima, I must pay many respects to overwhelming material quantity and skilful operations of American forces.

On the other hand, I am bursting with emotion, seeing the sacred spirit of General Kuribayashi and his officers and men who fought bravely for their honour

Ah! Many Japanese and American brave men died for their country on Iwo Jima and I cannot calculate how many families and relatives there are.

Now bloody war came to an end and feeling peace is here. There is no hatred and anger between Americans and Japanese.

I am very honored if my humble booklet will give mere suggestion to American officers and men now in Iwo Jima and all Japanese and American surviving families to remind the situation of those days.

Appendix.

Instructions of war telegraphed from Lieutenant General Kuribayashi to the Chief of the General Staff.

I will write down the American tactics, effect of our arms, etc. following my memory.

1. From the landing of the enemy on Iwo Jima to February 20th, 2nd Lieutenant Nakamura attached to the 8th Independent Anti-tank Gun Unit, destroyed one score of the amphibious tanks by handling himself the 47mm anti-tank gun and died a heroic death.
2. . However firm and stout pill-boxes you may build easily at the beach they will be destroyed by bombardment of main armament of the battle ships. It is better to build dummy pill-boxes at the beach and concentrate the enemy's shooting to this point.
3. As the enemy is using plain language for reporting information it is wise to listen to them and understand their plan and movement
4. The violence of the enemy's bombardments are far beyond description. Especially a small isolated island like Iwo Jima when bombarded severely by hundreds of various warships day and night with forty or fifty aircraft always in the air ready to fire against every symptom they are able to find, not even one man can scarcely move a step during daytime. Even at night, it takes about more than 10 hours for young officer to walk about 1 kilometer for communication. Telephone lines are completely cut off.
5. All positions, especially southern districts are almost completely destroyed by the severe bombardment from ships and had great damages on camouflaged installations and men. The bombardment from ships were not less than 30,000 rounds per day.
6. We need to reconsider the power of bombardment from ships. The beach positions we made on this island by using many materials, days and great efforts, were destroyed within 3 days so that they were nearly unable to be used again. Every main position was also destroyed by day and night bombardment from ships and the lay of the land has changed completely. Beach-position firing was done from battleships and other warships anchored at the distance of 1000 to 2000 meters.
Firing against main positions are done by seaplane scouting and observing unsparing time and ammunition.
Power of the American warships and aircraft makes every landing operation possible to whatever beachhead they like, and preventing them from landing means nothing but great damages, therefore for landing operations we must cut the number of the coast guns and installations to the smallest and crush the ships. Defence of isolated island which lacks this condition could never exist.
7. If you want to use telephone, you must bury the line or at least equip gutter for them.
8. The enemy finds the radio station by using direction detector and concentrates their firing to them, therefore commanding post must be pretty far from the radio station, but at the time it is necessary to take measures so as to obtain communication.

9. Adjacent to the commanding post of the enemy is generally clamour, and there are some using lights.
10. Long period of time and enormous number of men used for the extension work of the first and Motoyama airfield have impeded the defence, fortification and drill greatly. We must avoid constructing hopeless airfield.
11. Position must be selected where it is out of the ships' range without being restrained from the direct covering of airfield. Especially we must attach great importance to the anti-tank defence. Anti-tank obstacles must be equipped in and front of the position.
12. It is no exaggeration to say that victory or defeat of fighting on land is decided by aircraft and tanks. In the future we must endeavour our best to construct this two arms.
13. For artillery middle-size mortar (20cm) and rockets (20cm), for anti-tank gun, type 90 field guns are most effective (7.5cm).
14. Nearly all Army and Naval guns placed near the beach for firing on landing craft and troops were destroyed by the bombardments from ships before the enemy landed.
15. For defending an isolated island, it is absolutely necessary to accumulate large quantities of ammunition for guns, mortars and hand grenades. On this island most guns except the one at the seaside existed pretty long, but the ammunition ran short in only a week.
16. The enemy's air control is very strong. 100 or at least 30 aircraft are flying ceaselessly from early morning to night above this small island, and if they discover any symptom they began to attack it with obstinate bombardments or machine gun firing, competing mutually. Their bombardments from warships led by observation planes are quick and exact and give unimaginable damages to defence positions, and if our anti-aircraft guns start firing the enemy's aircraft usually destroy our guns at once.
17. The enemy's tanks have strong destructive power, slow but steady advance, full usage of material's power and avoid the damage extremely. If our anti-tank gun appears they retire quickly, let the naval guns led by observation planes, destroy them, and then advance.
18. The enemy has 2 or 3 handlers of flame projectors among 50 or 60 men, so it is necessary for us to snipe these handlers immediately.
19. The enemy's penetrating attack through our front line is done with tanks under cover of violent machine gun artillery and mortar firing, then we have no means to counter them.